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THE IMPACT OF AUDIT COMMITTEE EXPERTISE ON AUDIT QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM UK AUDIT 
FEES 
 
ABSTRACT 
Governance regulators currently place great emphasis on ensuring the presence of financial 
expertise on audit committees (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002; UK Corporate Governance Code 2003-2016).  
Underlying this is a belief that greater expertise enhances the effectiveness of audit committees and, 
by extension, the quality of the external audit.  This study investigates the impact of audit 
committee expertise on one measure of audit quality - audit fees paid by FTSE350 companies.  Our 
analysis finds that audit committees possessing greater levels of financial expertise are associated 
with higher audit fees.  When we segregate financial expertise between accounting and non-
accounting, we find that the positive impact identified is driven by non-accounting expertise.  
Furthermore, when we separate FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms we find the impact of financial 
expertise is confined to FTSE250 firms.  Our findings are important as they highlight the usefulness of 
segregating financial expertise between specialists and non-specialists, something which regulators 
in the UK and in the USA currently do not do.  Our findings also highlight the potential value of audit 
committee expertise in smaller as opposed to larger listed firms, suggesting that the value of 
expertise to audit quality depends on the specific financial reporting challenges firms face.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The past twenty five years have witnessed a renewed focus on the governance of companies, 
motivated largely by a number of high-profile corporate failures, many subsequently found to 
possess either weak or non-existent governance structures.  The almost universal response has been 
the introduction of stronger governance in the hope that this will serve both to prevent 
unacceptable behaviour and increase the external transparency of what companies do and how they 
do it.   In an effort to enhance the quality of firms’ governance, audit committees have been 
identified as an important mechanism through which the quality of financial reporting can be 
enhanced (Sarbanes Oxley, 2002; UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010-2016).  A key component of 
current governance recommendations in the UK is that audit committees should possess at least one 
member with “recent and relevant financial experience” (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2016: 
C.3.1).  Broadly similar provisions apply elsewhere with, for example, Section 407 of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) in the USA also stipulating that at least one member should be a financial 
expert.  
Running parallel to the evolution of audit committee governance, academic research has 
sought to understand the use and usefulness of various audit committee characteristics with a 
particular emphasis on whether these characteristics influence audit quality (Zaman, Hudaib & 
Haniffa, 2011; Chan, Liu & Sun, 2013; Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2014).  As 
discussed by Armstrong, Guay & Weber (2010) and Ghafran & O’Sullivan (2013), much of this 
research has been motivated by the emergence of increased governance regulation and the 
identification of a number of characteristics that governance regulators have deemed necessary to 
achieve greater audit committee effectiveness.  As DeFond & Zhang (2014) note in the context of 
audit committee changes introduced in the USA by SOX, the required changes attempt to increase 
audit quality by improving client governance and thereby increasing client demand for audit quality.  
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As a result, this strand of research has investigated the impact of audit committee size, 
independence, meeting frequency and the presence of financial expertise on a number of audit 
quality proxies, one of which is audit fees.  The overall expectation in this strand of research is that 
higher levels of the recommended characteristics result in more intensive and more expensive 
audits.  The available empirical evidence suggests that audit committee size and independence have 
a positive impact on audit fees (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, & Riley, 2002; Abbott, Parker, Peters & 
Raghunandan, 2003; Lee & Mande, 2005; Vafeas & Waegelein, 2007; Mitra, Hossain & Deis, 2007; 
Boo & Sharma, 2008 and Zaman et al. 2011).  The findings in respect of meeting frequency are more 
mixed with Carcello et al. (2002) and Mitra et al. (2007) failing to find a significant impact while 
Krishnan & Visvanathan (2009) and Zaman et al. (2011) report a positive impact.  However, while 
more frequent meetings may suggest greater committee diligence and hence lower fees, it is also 
possible that it may signal more serious audit-related issues that may serve to increase client risk 
and therefore result in higher fees.    
In addition to size, independence and meeting frequency, there is a particular interest in the 
value of audit committee expertise since, as discussed by Tanyi & Smith (2015), financial expertise is 
important in safeguarding the financial reporting process.  Specifically, financial experts on audit 
committees are seen as being best placed to evaluate those areas of the committee’s work requiring 
technical evaluation and decision-making.  Existing research shows no consistent evidence on the 
impact of an audit committee’s financial expertise and audit fees with studies showing a mixture of 
findings, often undermined by the lack of consistency in the definition of what actually constitutes 
expertise.  For example, in one of the earliest studies, Carcello et al. (2002) define expertise in terms 
of other directorships and report a positive impact on audit fees.  Abbott et al. (2003), although 
using a broader definition capturing both qualifications and experience, also report a positive 
impact.  However, using broadly similar measures of expertise, both Lee & Mande (2005) in the USA 
and Zaman et al. (2011) in the UK find no impact.  Using narrower definitions of expertise, typically 
meaning members with professional accounting qualifications and experience, Krishnan & 
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Visvanathan (2009) report a negative impact while Goodwin-Stewart & Kent (2006) and Rainsbury, 
Bradbury & Cahn, (2009) find no impact.  In summary, therefore, existing research has shown mixed 
findings in relation to the value of expertise on audit committees but studies also display significant 
variation in how that expertise is defined. 
The purpose of this paper is to undertake a comprehensive study of the impact of audit 
committee expertise on audit quality as represented by audit fees in large UK companies.  Our study 
takes forward existing knowledge in a number of important respects.  First, to our knowledge this is 
the first UK study to focus specifically on the relationship between financial expertise and audit 
fees1.  This is important since UK governance regulations operate on a comply or explain basis 
without legislative backing so firms remain free to make decisions on the presence and extent of 
financial expertise they deem appropriate for them.  Second, as noted earlier, existing studies use a 
variety of financial expertise measures and report very mixed results.  In this study we use both 
broad (i.e. qualifications and experience) and narrow (i.e. accounting) definitions of expertise in 
order to understand whether any impact on audit quality is sensitive to the definitions used.  Third, 
in addition to more traditional definitions of expertise, we extend our analysis to incorporate 
expertise gained by audit committee members doing similar work in other firms to see whether the 
expertise expected to be gained from broader audit committee involvement impacts on audit quality 
in the member’s home firm.  Fourth, we segregate our sample into FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms since 
size is expected to influence the governance issues faced by firms and, consequently, we are anxious 
to ascertain whether this also influences the use and usefulness of expertise in enhancing audit 
quality. A key issue here is whether smaller listed firms place more emphasis on the monitoring 
provided by financial experts (as well as the nature of that expertise) compared to FTSE100 firms 
who may be expected to already have significant levels of financial transparency in place (Armstrong 
et al. 2010).  Finally, our study is not just of academic interest but is especially relevant to 
policymakers in the UK and elsewhere who continually work to seek an improvement in the quality 
of firm governance and have placed audit committee expertise at the centre of current reforms.  By 
6 
 
undertaking a comprehensive study of the relationship between a range of different measures of 
expertise and audit fees our findings can help regulators to make more evidence-based decisions 
going forward.  
    We find that audit committees possessing greater levels of financial expertise are associated 
with higher audit fees.  When we segregate financial expertise between accounting and non-
accounting, we find that it is the non-accounting expertise that is driving the higher fees.  We also 
perform separate analysis for FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms and find that the positive impact of 
expertise is confined to FTSE250 firms, again driven by members with non-accounting expertise.   
When we extend our definitions of expertise to include audit committee members’ experience on 
other audit committees we find that this does not influence audit fees.  Our findings are important 
as they highlight the usefulness of segregating financial expertise between specialists and non-
specialists and also highlight the particular reliance on high quality audits by financial experts 
without a technical accounting background.  This is reassuring as it illustrates that broader financial 
expertise has a potentially important monitoring role.  Our findings relating to firm size suggest that 
it is the quality of audits in smaller listed firms that benefit from greater expertise on their audit 
committees.  This illustrates the importance of recognising that even firms within the FTSE350 
display significant heterogeneity and firms of different size place different emphasis on the 
monitoring value of financial expertise in their pursuit of audit quality.   Our findings are consistent 
with the notion that financial expertise in larger listed firms may be less important in the pursuit of 
audit quality, perhaps due to the already greater levels of financial transparency these firms exhibit.  
In the case of smaller listed firms, however, it seems that financial expertise, especially non-
accounting expertise, is important in enhancing the quality of their audits.  This evidence is 
consistent with arguments put forward by Armstrong et al. (2010) who suggest that one reason that 
companies may utilise more financial expertise is because they believe such expertise will help them 
to improve the transparency of their financial reporting.    More broadly, our results also feed into 
discussions around the need for researchers and policymakers to appreciate that no single set of 
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governance recommendations fits all firms and that different firms emphasise different governance 
instruments depending on the specific governance challenges they face.  
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section briefly summarises the development of audit 
committee regulation in the UK over the past 25 years, focusing specifically on recommendations in 
respect of financial expertise.  This is important as it helps to contextualise our study design as well 
as our empirical analysis and findings.  Section three discusses the theoretical framework for our 
study as well as reviewing existing literature on the impact of audit committee expertise on various 
measures of audit quality but specifically audit fees.  Section four describes the sample as well as 
introducing and justifying the variables we use.  In section five we discuss our empirical findings 
while our conclusions and a discussion of the academic and policy implications of our findings are 
presented in section six.   
 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF AUDIT COMMITTEE GOVERNANCE IN THE UK 
Over the past twenty five years the governance of audit committees has developed significantly in 
the UK.  Initial recommendations in respect of the governance potential of audit committees 
emanated from Cadbury (1992) which recommended that all listed companies establish “properly 
constituted audit committees as an important step in raising standards of corporate governance” 
(4.37).  The central component of Cadbury’s (1992) appropriate test was that audit committees 
should comprise non-executive directors only and possess a minimum of three members, a majority 
of whom should be independent non-executives.  It further recommended that audit committees 
should meet no less than twice a year.  In the years immediately following the Cadbury (1992) 
recommendations, virtually all UK-listed companies established audit committees and in a 
subsequent report of compliance Cadbury (1995) showed widespread compliance with the original 
recommendations.  
The next major change in respect of audit committee governance arose in the wake of the 
Enron collapse in the US whereby Sir Robert Smith (Smith, 2003) was asked to consider the 
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effectiveness of audit committees in the UK and his recommendations underpinned subsequent 
changes incorporated in the revised Combined Code (2003).  In particular, the revised Combined 
Code (2003) endorsed Smith’s (2003) recommendations that: audit committees should comprise a 
minimum of three members; all members should be independent non-executives; at least one 
member should have recent and relevant financial experience; and audit committees should meet at 
least three times per year.   
Of particular interest to this study is the fact that successive UK Corporate Governance Codes 
have avoided any attempt to define what it understands as representing “recent and relevant 
financial experience”, leaving companies to decide whether individuals satisfy this requirement and 
disclosing whether they have complied.  The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) did consider replacing 
the requirement for at least one audit committee member to have ‘recent and relevant financial 
experience’ to at least one member to have ‘competence in accounting and/or auditing’ (FRC, 2015). 
Even though the FRC ultimately decided against this change2, it does serve to focus attention on the 
question as to whether financial expertise on audit committees should be narrowly or more broadly 
defined and, perhaps more importantly, whether it matters.   
A key objective of this study is to understand the use and usefulness of expertise in UK audit 
committees.  In particular, we examine whether broadly based accounting expertise, as currently 
recommended by the UK Corporate Governance Code, has an impact on audit quality – as 
represented by audit fees.  We extend the analysis by segregating our expertise measure beyond 
current recommendations by separating our accounting and non-accounting expertise to see if this 
categorization impacts differently on audit quality.  Finally, we segregate our sample between 
FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms in order to ascertain whether expertise (both broadly and narrowly 
defined) has a different impact depending on firm size. This is important as it allows us to investigate 
whether the value of expertise (and the nature of it) depends on the governance challenges 
different firms face. 
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3. AUDIT QUALITY, AUDIT FEES AND AUDIT COMMITTEE EXPERTISE  
A number of researchers have presented comprehensive reviews of existing research on audit 
quality as well as presenting revised frameworks to facilitate future research in the field (Francis, 
2004; Francis, 2011; Knechel, Niemi & Zerni, 2013; DeFond & Zhang, 2014).  Even though the notion 
of audit quality has traditionally been seen in terms of DeAngelo’s (1981) seminal definition of “the 
market assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client’s 
accounting system, and (b) report the breach” (p. 186), more recently researchers have argued that 
audit quality goes beyond such a binary interpretation.  Specifically, DeFond and Zhang (2014) 
suggest that audit quality should be seen as “greater assurance that the financial statements 
faithfully reflect the firm’s underlying economics, conditioned on its financial reporting system and 
innate characteristics” (p. 281).  DeFond and Zhang (2014) argue that it is not just the outcome of 
the audit process that needs to be considered but also both client demand factors and auditor 
supply factors as well as regulatory intervention.  Similarly, Francis (2011) argues that audit quality 
should be viewed as a continuum rather than a binary process noting that very few audit failures 
actually occur but there is likely to be significant variation in the quality of those that exceed the 
minimum audit quality threshold.   Knechel et al. (2013) follow a similar line of argument focusing on 
the inputs, process and outputs of the audit but also acknowledging the wider context in which the 
inputs and process of the audit occur.   
While the DeFond and Zhang (2014) audit quality framework seeks to present a holistic view 
on the overall audit quality process, the work of Francis (2011) and Knechel et al. (2013) is primarily 
concerned with supply-side issues and therefore focuses on audit quality from the auditor’s 
perspective.  This is an important distinction in the context of this study as DeFond and Zhang (2014) 
view the audit-client contracting environment as an important input into the audit process and 
thereby see audit fees as a key aspect of the audit-client contracting environment.  It is argued that 
audit fees are a useful proxy for audit quality as they are expected to measure the auditor’s effort 
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level, “which is an input to the audit process that is intuitively related to audit quality” (DeFond & 
Zhang, 2014: P. 289).  
DeFond and Zhang (2014) outline a number of advantages in utilizing audit fees in measuring 
audit quality including the fact that audit fees are continuous and are thereby capable of capturing 
subtle variations in audit quality as well as the fact that the audit fee literature has sufficiently 
evolved to employ sophisticated fee models with very high R-squares.  The latter point helps to 
alleviate concerns about correlated omitted variables which may be a more significant issue in other 
audit quality proxies (DeFond & Zhang, 2014).    However, as acknowledged by DeFond and Zhang 
(2014), the use of audit fees to represent audit quality also has drawbacks.  In particular, while 
higher audit fees may indeed indicate greater audit effort they may also represent an additional risk 
premium imposed by the auditor to counter an increased probability of financial liabilities arising 
from the audit (Simunic & Stein, 1996; Seetharaman, Gul & Lynn, 2002; Bell, Doogar & Solomon, 
2008).  Furthermore, variations in audit fees may also reflect changes in the auditor’s efficiency.  
Finally, of course audit fees capture both supply and demand factors.  Consequently, as highlighted 
by DeFond and Zhang (2014), researchers must take particular care in interpreting the results from 
audit fee studies as “an increase in audit fees cannot be unambiguously interpreted as an increase in 
audit quality” (p. 290). 
DeFond and Zhang (2014) also discuss the role of audit committees in their revised audit 
quality framework emphasising their role in helping audit clients achieve their desired levels of audit 
quality.  Specifically, DeFond and Zhang (2014) note the increased emphasis on audit committee 
independence and expertise is designed to “increase client demand for audit quality” (p. 306).  This 
motivates us to investigate whether audit committee expertise impacts one aspect of audit quality – 
the level of audit demand as represented by audit fees.  The following paragraphs discuss the 
potential impact of audit committee expertise on audit fees in more detail. 
Audit committees are a fundamental element of governance reforms across most of the 
developed world and, as noted by Armstrong et al. (2010) and Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013), as a 
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result they have attracted a great deal of academic attention with the direction of research heavily 
influenced by the evolution of their regulatory role.  The theoretical underpinning for audit 
committees is agency theory whereby appropriately constructed audit committees are expected to 
enhance governance quality, in particular by improving the quality of financial reporting and auditing 
(Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright, 2004; Turley & Zaman, 2007). Even though issues around the 
technical expertise of audit committee members has gathered momentum in recent years, the 
importance of audit committee expertise has been recognized for some time (Kalbers & Fogarty, 
1993; Lee & Stone, 1997; Levitt, 1998; Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999).  Central to current regulatory 
developments is an awareness that, in order to really fulfil their monitoring role, audit committees 
need specific experience and expertise in the area of financial reporting. However, especially in the 
USA, there has been significant debate as to how best to define such expertise for operational 
purposes.  This lack of consistency as to what financial expertise really means has also flowed over 
into academic work with studies using different variables to capture expertise and, as a result, 
producing results that are not easily compared. 
In the USA, the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC, 1999) recommended that firms should establish 
audit committees with at least three financially literate directors and include at least one financial 
expert.  This recommendation was subsequently adopted by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in December 1999.  However, in the wake of Enron and other financial failures at 
the beginning of the last decade, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) was passed to improve corporate 
governance generally and the financial reporting process in particular.  SOX included new provisions 
requiring companies to disclose whether or not the audit committee included at least one member 
who is a financial expert.  This requirement reflects the belief of congress that “the effectiveness of 
the audit committee depends in part on its members’ knowledge of and experience in auditing and 
financial matters” (US Senate, 2002, p.32). The SEC went on to define a financial expert for the 
purposes of SOX as someone with experience in accounting, supervising financial professionals and 
overseeing the performance of a company.  It should be noted though that the SEC definition of the 
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attributes required for a financial expert is seen as being quite broad, crucially including supervisory 
experience (e.g. CEO and board chair) in addition to the narrower financial expertise associated with 
formal accounting qualifications and/or experience. Similarly in the UK, Smith (2003) recommended 
that at least one audit committee member should have “recent and relevant financial experience”, a 
recommendation that has been incorporated into all governance recommendations since.  As noted 
in section 2 earlier, UK regulations do not offer a definition of the attributes needed for audit 
committee members designated as financial experts even though the FRC does suggest the 
desirability of one member having a professional accounting qualification (FRC, 2015). 
In terms of broader audit committee research, studies seem to provide some empirical 
support for the value of having financial experts on audit committees.  For example, Abbott et al. 
(2004) and Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that firms with financial experts on audit committees are 
less likely to experience financial reporting restatements.  Furthermore, Bedard, Chtourou and 
Courteau, (2004) find that the presence of at least one financial expert on the audit committee is 
negatively associated with aggressive earnings management. Lo, Wong and Firth, (2010) find that 
firms with financial experts on their audit committees are less likely to engage in transfer pricing 
manipulations. Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) find that the proportion of financial experts on the 
audit committee is positively related to the demand for audit effort, as measured by the audit fee, 
while He and Yang (2014) report that the proportion of financial experts on audit committees is 
associated with significantly lower levels of earnings management.  
Subsequent research has sought to incorporate issues around broader versus narrower 
definitions of expertise in an attempt to ascertain whether the nature of expertise influences audit 
committee effectiveness.  Therefore, for example, Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi, (2010) separate 
expertise into three categories, accounting, finance and supervisory, and find that only accounting 
expertise (i.e. CPAs, CFOs, financial controllers or other major accounting-related positions) are 
associated with higher quality accruals.  Similarly, in a study of the stock market’s reaction to audit 
committee appointments, DeFond, Hann and Hu (2005) find a more favorable reaction to the 
13 
 
appointment of accounting experts.  Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) find that audit committees 
with a higher proportion of accounting experts pursue more conservative accounting policies.  
Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein and Neal (2006) find evidence of less aggressive earnings management 
in firms with members with accounting experience on their audit committee while Schmidt and 
Wilkins (2013) note how companies with more accounting financial expertise on the audit 
committee are associated with improved financial reporting timeliness.  In summary, this evidence 
suggests that financial expertise on the audit committee may improve the quality of financial 
reporting more broadly and this may actually be due to accounting expertise rather than broader 
finance and/or supervisory expertise. 
Studies that have investigated the impact of financial expertise on audit fees have not always 
used similar definitions hence making some of the findings rather difficult to interpret3.  For 
example, in one of the first such studies, Carcello et al. (2002) measure audit committee expertise as 
the average number of other directorships held by audit committee members arguing that greater 
exposure to other boards provides audit committee members with enhanced monitoring expertise.  
In their empirical analysis, Carcello et al. (2002) find that expertise has a positive impact on audit 
fees.  Abbott et al. (2003) use the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC, 1999) definition of financial 
expertise which is broadly similar to the one subsequently used by the SEC in applying the SOX 
requirements – i.e. including both accounting and supervisory experience.  Abbott et al. (2003) find 
that expertise has a positive impact on audit fees.  Lee and Mande (2005), also utilizing the SEC’s 
broad definition of expertise, find no significant link between audit committee expertise and audit 
fees.  
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) use both the broad definition used by the SEC (i.e. financial 
and supervisory experience) as well as a narrower definition of accounting expertise.  In particular, 
their narrower definition of an “accounting expert” includes members with experience as a CPA, 
auditor, principal or CFO, controller, or principal or chief accounting officer (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 
2009, p. 125).  In their empirical analysis Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) find that, using the 
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broader measure, the extent of financial expertise has no significant impact on audit fees.  However, 
when they include the narrower accounting definition, they find there is a negative and significant 
impact on audit fees.  Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) interpret their findings as consistent with the 
notion that external auditors value the increased quality of monitoring accounting experts are 
expected to undertake in carrying out their audit committee duties and provide a fee discount for 
this.  Of course, their findings also suggest that auditors do not have a similar view when expertise is 
more broadly defined.  Interestingly, Chan et al. (2013), using a definition of accounting financial 
expertise similar to Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009), find no significant link with audit fees.   
A relatively small number of non-USA studies have investigated the relationship between 
audit committee expertise and audit fees.  In an Australian study, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) 
measure financial expertise as the proportion of the audit committee who have an accounting or 
finance qualification.  In their empirical analysis, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) find no 
significant impact for expertise.  In a New Zealand study, Rainsbury et al. (2009), defining expertise 
in terms of a dummy variable representing the presence of one or more qualified accountants on the 
audit committee, also fail to find that expertise has a significant impact on audit fees.  Finally, in the 
only UK study to have addressed the issue, Zaman et al. (2011) measure expertise in terms of 
“accounting, finance or professional accounting qualifications” (footnote 7, page 176).  They then 
use a dummy variable to denote the presence of at least one such-qualified member, hence their 
expertise variable.   In their subsequent empirical analysis, Zaman et al. (2011) find no evidence that 
this binary expertise variable has a significant impact on audit fees. 
Experience and expertise of audit committee members in that role is also an important aspect 
of audit committee effectiveness in overseeing the financial reporting process. Vafeas and 
Waegelein (2007) argue that governance expertise is important in maintaining audit quality and 
document a positive and significant association between governance expertise and audit fees. They 
define audit committee governance expertise as the audit committee members' experience of 
serving on another audit committee. However, in another study, Vafeas (2005) fails to find any 
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statistically significant link between any such expertise and earnings quality.  In the context of UK 
audit committees, it is reasonable to assume that broader audit committee experience is likely to 
encourage audit committee members to demand more extensive audits.  Therefore, we can expect 
audit committees with greater other audit committee experience to be associated with higher audit 
fees. 
In light of the above discussion and the evidence reviewed therein, our study has three 
objectives.  First, we seek to ascertain whether the extent of financial expertise, broadly defined, on 
UK audit committees has an impact on audit quality, as represented by audit fees.  Second, we 
investigate whether the nature of financial expertise on UK audit committees impacts audit quality.  
Specifically we wish to understand whether accounting and non-accounting expertise impact 
differently (if at all).  Finally, we go beyond financial expertise as typically addressed in the existing 
literature and also investigate whether audit committee member experience on other audit 
committees impacts audit quality.  The formal hypotheses we seek to test are as follows: 
H1:  The level of audit committee expertise is positively associated with audit quality and, 
consequently, audit fees; 
H2: The level of accounting expertise on the audit committee is positively associated with audit 
quality and, consequently, audit fees. 
H3: The level of non-accounting expertise on the audit committee is positively associated with 
audit quality and, consequently, audit fees. 
H4:  The extent of other audit committee experience of audit committee members is positively 
associated with audit quality and, consequently, audit fees. 
 
4. SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
The starting point for our analysis was the identification of companies who were in the FTSE350 for 
the duration of our study period, between 2007 and 2010.  This is important since, as mentioned in 
section two, current governance recommendations in the UK make a distinction between FTSE350 
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firms and other listed firms whereby the latter are subject to a relatively less onerous set of 
governance recommendations.  Of relevance to this study, for example, is that non-FTSE350 firms 
are not required to possess a majority of independent non-executives and are also required to 
possess a minimum of two audit committee members as opposed to three for FTSE350 companies.  
This resulted in 60 firms being omitted since they were not FTSE350 members throughout our study 
period.  In common with most studies in this area we exclude all financial firms, principally insurance 
companies and banks, as they have different regulatory environments as well as different reporting 
conventions compared to other companies.  This resulted in the omission of 280 firms.  Finally, due 
to the absence of information on some of our key variables, either due to non-reporting of some 
items in annual reports or the required financial data not being available on Datastream, we omitted 
a further 69 firms. This resulted in a final sample of 991 company/year observations.  In terms of 
comprehensiveness, this represents 88.5 per cent of non-financial FTSE350 firms.  The details of our 
sample selection procedure are outlined in table 1a.  In terms of industrial classification of our 
sample companies we follow Zaman et al. (2011) in grouping our firms into five sectors: consumer, 
industrial, mineral exploration, services and utilities.  The industrial breakdown of our sample is 
presented in table 1b. 
 
INSERT TABLES 1a and 1b ABOUT HERE 
 
The next step was to locate the annual reports for our sample companies for the period 2007 
to 2010.  These were obtained either directly from the companies’ own websites or from the filings 
section of ThomsonOne Banker.  Access to the annual reports is crucial for our study as we rely on 
this information to source data for the majority of our variables.  In particular, much of the data on 
board and audit committee characteristics as well as some of the explanatory variables used in prior 
audit fee studies can only be sourced directly from companies’ annual reports.  In addition to annual 
reports, we also utilized Datastream to source data for our financial variables.   
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Our dependent variable is the log of the audit fee as disclosed in each company’s annual 
report.  Our explanatory variables can be broadly categorized between those relating to audit 
committee characteristics and control variables found to be significant in existing audit pricing 
studies.  In terms of audit committee characteristics, we utilize a range of variables to capture the 
features we are investigating.  In terms of audit committee expertise we utilize four variables: (i) a 
variable representing the proportion of audit committee members with broadly defined financial 
expertise4; (ii) a variable representing the proportion of audit committee members who are 
accounting experts; (iii) a variable representing the proportion of audit committee members who 
possess non-accounting expertise; and (iv) we also go beyond knowledge-based expertise in that we 
also include a variable representing the average number of additional audit committee seats in other 
UK listed companies held by audit committee members in order to ascertain whether additional 
audit committee experience has an impact on audit fees.   
Following the recommendations of best practice from successive UK corporate governance 
codes since 2003 (see section two earlier), we include variables representing the remaining three 
components regulators currently deem necessary for audit committee effectiveness in FTSE350 
firms; size, independence and meeting frequency.  Specifically, we include separate dummy 
variables indicating where firms satisfy each of these recommended components as well as separate 
continuous variables representing the actual size, level of independence and frequency of meetings.    
We use a range of control variables, largely motivated by the findings of existing audit pricing 
research5.  Since this study utilizes governance disclosures subsequent to Higgs (2003) we are able to 
identify independent non-executives so our measure of board independence is the proportion of the 
board represented by independent non-executives.  In common with the vast majority of existing 
studies, the log of assets is included as the most appropriate size variable and the log of the number 
of subsidiaries is used to represent complexity (Cobbin, 2002; Hay, Knechel & Wong, 2006).  
Consistent with previous studies, a number of variables are used to represent auditor risk: the 
proportion of total assets represented both by inventory and accounts receivable, and the firm’s 
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return on assets (Cobbin, 2002; Hay et al., 2006; Zaman et al., 2011).  We also include a dummy 
variable to represent audits undertaken by a London-based auditor since a number of prior UK 
studies have found that London-based auditors charge higher fees (e.g. Brinn, Peel, & Roberts, 1994; 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Clatworthy & Peel, 2007; Abdallah, Goergen & O’Sullivan, 2015).  We also include a 
variable representing the amount of non-audit fees the firm simultaneously pays the auditor.  Table 
2 includes definitions of the variables used in the study. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all our variables.  Firms in our sample pay, on average, 
£1,681,325 for their audit fee with a median payment of £606,000.  Of particular interest to this 
study are the descriptive statistics in relation to audit committee expertise.  78.39 per cent of audit 
committee members are classified as possessing overall financial expertise.  When we disaggregate 
overall financial expertise between accounting and non-accounting expertise, we find that 34.85 per 
cent of audit committee members possess specific accounting expertise with 43.54 per cent of audit 
committee members possessing non-accounting expertise.  In unreported figures we find that 85 per 
cent of audit committees have at least one accounting expert while 86 per cent have at least one 
non-accounting expert.  These figures are reassuring as they suggest that audit committees in large 
UK listed firms comprise overwhelmingly of members possessing some financial expertise.  
Consequently, while current recommendations focus on minimum levels of expertise the reality, for 
larger firms at least, is that audit committees contain significant levels of broadly defined financial 
expertise with most audit committees containing a rich mix of accounting and non-accounting 
expertise.  On average audit committee members sit on 0.35 other audit committees ranging from 
none to an average of 2 other audit committee positions.  Audit committees in our sample have, on 
average, 3.4 members with a median composition of 3 members.  The requirement for a minimum 
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of three members in the various UK Corporate Governance Codes seems to be largely adhered to 
with 91 per cent of sample firms meeting this recommendation.  Audit committees in our sample 
meet on average 3.9 times during the year with a median of 4 meetings per year.  94 per cent of 
audit committees in our sample meet at least three times per year as currently recommended by 
governance regulators.  87 per cent of audit committees are comprised only of independent non-
executives with the average proportion of independent members on audit committees at 95.29 per 
cent6.  
In table 4 we include a correlation matrix showing two-way Pearson correlations between all 
variables included in the study.  Correlations are interesting in the context of audit pricing studies as 
they highlight potential associations between independent variables which then allows us ensure 
this is controlled for in the multivariate analysis.  In this study the correlation matrix also provides 
some interesting insights into the associations between our key expertise variables and the other 
variables used in the study.  For example, from table 4 we can see that while the level of broad 
expertise has a positive association with audit fees, when this is separated between accounting and 
non-accounting expertise it is the non-accounting expertise that retains a significant positive 
association while the accounting expertise shows a negative association.  In addition, the 
correlations highlight a positive association between broadly defined financial expertise and the 
holding of other audit committee positions by audit committee members.  However, when 
segregated, it is clear that the significant association is with the accounting expertise only, 
suggesting a distinct demand for accounting rather than non-accounting expertise on audit 
committees.  Finally, it is also interesting to note that audit committee size is negatively correlated 
with accounting expertise but positively correlated with non-accounting expertise.  This may suggest 
that as audit committees grow in size, the additional members are more likely to be non-accounting 
rather than accounting experts. 
 
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
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6. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Table 5 presents the results of a series of regressions seeking to ascertain the impact of audit 
committee expertise on audit fees.  In designing our empirical tests we follow most existing studies 
in utilizing OLS regressions.  However, since we have many firms appearing in our sample up to four 
times (i.e. between 2007 and 2010 inclusive) we are conscious of what Petersen (2009) describes as 
the “unobserved firm effect” whereby the residuals of a given firm may be correlated across years 
and result in biased standard errors that underestimate the true standard errors.  In order to 
overcome this we follow Petersen’s (2009) advice and use clustered standard errors since they 
“account for the residual dependence created by the firm effect” (p. 437)7,8.  Specifically, in all 
regressions we cluster at firm level, this represents 251 different clusters each representing an 
individual firm.  Of course we also have the possibility of time effects but, as discussed in Petersen 
(2009) and Kezdi (2004), clustered standard errors are unlikely to be appropriate when the number 
of clusters is small (i.e. four years in this case).  Instead, as suggested by Petersen (2009), in addition 
to clustering by firm, we also use time dummies in all our regression to control for time effects. 
In regressions 1a and 1b of table 5 we represent audit committee expertise with the variable 
representing the proportion of audit committee members with some financial expertise (i.e. our 
broad measure of expertise).  In regression 1a we use dummy variables for the other three audit 
committee characteristics – indicating a minimum of three committee members; all independent; 
non-executives and a minimum of three annual meetings.  In regression 1b we substitute these 
dummies with continuous values of these three characteristics – indicating actual audit committee 
size, the proportion of members who are independent non-executives and the number of meetings.  
In both regressions 1a and 1b our broad measure of audit committee financial expertise has a 
positive and significant impact on audit fees suggesting that the extent of audit committee financial 
expertise does enhance audit quality.  Of the remaining audit committee characteristics, the findings 
from regressions 1a and 1b suggest that meeting frequency also has a positive impact on audit fees 
with some evidence that audit committees with fewer members than recommended may also be 
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associated with higher fees.  The positive impact of meeting frequency is consistent with such audits 
being more complex and/or troublesome and, thereby, requiring more attention from both audit 
committee members and auditors.  Similarly, auditors may view audit committees with fewer 
members than recommended as requiring more effort.  Of the remaining control variables, all exert 
a significant impact in the expected direction with the exception of stock which has a negative rather 
than a positive impact.  However, this may suggest that in current auditing technologies the auditing 
of stock may actually be fairly straightforward and involve reduced rather than increased audit 
effort. 
In regressions 2 and 3 we segregate broad financial expertise between accounting and non-
accounting while controlling for other audit committee characteristics, again both at their dummy 
and absolute values.  In regressions 2a and 2b the proportion of accounting experts on the audit 
committee has no discernible impact on audit fees.  In additional unreported analysis we also run 
regressions focusing only on professionally qualified accountants but these findings mirror our 
results in respect of accounting experts, that is showing no significant impact.  This evidence 
suggests that accounting expertise on its own does not significantly impact the extent of auditing 
undertaken and consequently the audit fee.  In regressions 3a and 3b, however, the proportion of 
non-accounting experts on the audit committee exerts a positive and significant impact on audit 
fees.  This exists regardless of whether the other audit committee variables are included at their 
dummy or absolute values but the level of statistical significance is greater when dummy values are 
used. This represents very strong evidence that it is the non-accounting experts who are driving 
more extensive audits rather than the accounting experts.     
In regressions 4a and 4b we replace the traditional expertise variables with a variable 
capturing audit committee members’ holding of audit committee positions elsewhere.  Specifically, 
we use a measure that represents the average number of other audit committees each audit 
committee member sits on.   Following on from hypothesis 4 we are interested to see whether audit 
effort and fees are driven by audit committee members’ experience on other audit committees.  As 
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before, in regression 4a we control for other audit committee characteristics in their dummy form 
while we use their absolute values in regression 4b.  In neither regression are the variables of 
interest statistically significant.  This suggests that the experience and/or expertise that audit 
committee members obtain from sitting on other audit committees does not seem to influence the 
extent of audits undertaken. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Current governance recommendations in the UK, including those relating to recommended 
audit committee characteristics, apply equally to all FTSE350 firms.  However, even within this 
categorization we are aware that firm size varies considerably.  In particular, FTSE100 firms are 
significantly larger, attract significantly greater investor and analyst coverage, and generally are 
perceived as being subject to greater external scrutiny than their FTSE250 counterparts.  An 
important implication of this is whether the impact of financial expertise exerts a different impact on 
audit quality depending on firm size.  In order to understand this we develop our study in two ways.  
First, we segregate our 991 firm/year observations between those that are FTSE100 firms 
throughout our study period (n=352) and those that are not (n=639).  We compare the mean and 
median values of each of our explanatory variables between these two sub-samples and highlight 
any statistical differences.  The results of this are presented in table 6.  Second, we re-run our OLS 
regressions separately for FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms to see whether our various expertise 
measurements impact on audit fees differently for the two subsamples. These results are presented 
in table 7. 
In table 6 we find that significant differences exist between the two sub-samples.  In 
particular, in terms of financial expertise, while the proportion of experts on the audit committee is 
relatively comparable, representations of the two types of expertise differ significantly between the 
two sub-samples.  Specifically, FTSE250 firms have a significantly higher proportion of accounting 
experts on their audit committees while FTSE100 firms have a significantly higher proportion of non-
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accounting experts.  This suggests that, in the audit committees of larger firms, the majority of 
financial expertise comes from non-accounting sources but most audit committees, regardless of 
FTSE category, also possess some minimum accounting expertise.  Our comparisons also highlight 
that audit committees in FTSE100 firms are significantly larger, possess a greater proportion of 
independent members and also meet more frequently than FTSE250 firms.  These differences 
suggest that as audit committees grow, the level of accounting expertise does not increase but the 
level of non-accounting expertise does.  This is interesting in the context of current governance 
recommendations whereby FTSE350 firms are expected to have a minimum level of financial 
expertise.  Our evidence suggests that firms not only possess this minimum level of financial 
expertise but they possess it in the narrower (i.e. accounting) definition of expertise. As expected, in 
terms of the control variables, FTSE100 firms are larger, possess more subsidiaries, possess more 
independent boards, are more likely to be audited by a London-based auditor, and are more likely to 
purchase greater levels of non-audit services from their auditors.  However, the proportion of assets 
in the form of both stock and debtors is actually lower in FTSE100 firms.   
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
In table 7 we replicate the four regressions from table 5 (using the absolute values of audit 
committee variables) but focus on our subsamples of FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms separately.  In 
regressions 1a and 1b we use our broad measure of audit committee financial expertise, as currently 
recommended by the UK Corporate Governance Code.  In our FTSE100 sample this variable shows 
no statistical significance while it is positive and very significant in the FTSE250 subsample.  This 
finding suggests that, in terms of a more intensive audit, financial expertise matters in the case of 
smaller listed firms but not so for the very largest firms.  This is consistent with Armstrong et al.’s 
(2010) argument that different types of firms may have different needs for financial expertise.  In 
particular, Armstrong et al. (2010) suggest that firms with a desire to monitor their financial 
reporting more intensely are expected to use financial expertise to help achieve this.  Our findings 
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support this with strong evidence that greater levels of financial expertise on the audit committees 
of smaller firms have a positive impact on audit quality.  In the case of FTSE100 firms, we fail to find 
that financial expertise influences audit quality.  Consistent with Armstrong et al. (2010), this is not 
surprising as we expect the quality and transparency of financial reporting in FTSE100 firms to be of 
high quality in any case and financial expertise is unlikely to be able to strengthen this further.  
Furthermore, as we observed earlier, audit committees in FTSE100 firms are larger, are more 
independent and meet more frequently which suggests that they also exhibit stronger audit 
committee governance thus leaving little scope for financial expertise to strengthen their 
monitoring.  The reverse is true in the case of FTSE250 firms where more active monitoring by 
financial experts may compensate for smaller committees, a relative lack of board independence, 
and fewer meetings.   
When we use the proportion of accounting expertise in regressions 2a and 2b in table 7 we 
find no significant impact in either of the subsamples.  This confirms our earlier findings for the full 
sample in that accounting expertise does not appear to influence audit intensity regardless of the 
size of listed firm. In regressions 3a and 3b we use the proportion of non-accounting expertise and 
find that this has a positive and statistically significant impact on audit fees in the FTSE250 
subsample but is not significant in the FTSE100 subsample.  This again refines our earlier findings 
that it is the non-accounting expertise that drives audit quality by showing that this actually 
predominantly relates to the smaller listed firms.  This suggests that non-accounting experts may be 
less confident in their own ability to directly monitor the quality of their firms’ financial reporting but 
instead encourage their auditors to undertake more intensive audits as a way of ensuring their own 
monitoring responsibilities are achieved. This is consistent with the work of O’Sullivan (2000) who, in 
the pre-Cadbury (1992) era in the UK (when audit committees were in their infancy), argued that 
non-executive directors sought to transfer their monitoring responsibilities to auditors by 
encouraging more extensive audits.  In regressions 4a and 4b we use the average number of audit 
25 
 
committee seats as an alternative measure of expertise but, as in the case of the full sample 
regressions, this has no discernable impact.   
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
We are conscious that endogeneity can be a major methodological concern for this sort of 
analysis with the possibility that incorrect casual inferences may be drawn from the regression 
results (Winship & Morgan, 1999; Abdallah et al.,2015)9.  As highlighted by Abdallah et al. (2015) the 
issue of endogeneity can be especially pertinent in the case of corporate governance research where 
not only can explanatory variables influence the dependent variable but also there exists the 
possibility that the dependent variable itself may influence one or more of the independent 
variables.   In our study, we are aware of this possibility and seek to ensure our results are not 
consequently prejudiced.  For example, while we test for the impact of financial expertise on audit 
quality it is equally plausible that firms may also seek to view greater expertise on the audit 
committee as a way of enhancing audit quality.  Similarly, while we test the impact of board 
independence on audit quality it is also plausible that the desire to enhance audit quality may 
encourage firms to improve the independence of their boards.  Furthermore, there is an established 
strand of research that highlights the possibility that audit fees and non-audit services may be co-
determined and a resulting need for researchers to seek to control for this (Lee & Mande, 2005; 
Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy & Raghunandan, 2003).     
With this in mind we follow the approach of Whisenant et al. (2003) by estimating a series of 
two-stage least squares regressions.  Specifically, after estimating our OLS regressions (as shown in 
table 5) we then re-estimate these regressions using an instrumental variable approach (i.e. two-
stage least squares).  Instead of using the actual value of the potentially endogenous variables in the 
second series of regressions, we substitute the predicted value of these variables (i.e. our 
instrumental variables).  We obtain the predicted values by running regressions whereby we regress 
the potentially endogenous variables separately on the exogenous variables in the audit fee 
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regressions in table 5.   We do this in three separate regressions focusing on the potential 
endogeneity of non-accounting expertise, board independence and non-audit fees respectively.  The 
results, which are not tabulated (but available from the authors on request), confirm our earlier 
findings.  Specifically, after seeking to control for possible endogeneity between audit committee 
expertise, board independence and non-audit fees and audit fees our original findings hold. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigates the impact of audit committee financial expertise on audit quality, as 
represented by audit fees, for a sample of FTSE350 firms.  From a theoretical perspective our study 
links in with and provides evidence on a contemporary literature on the determinants of audit 
quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014) while from a practical perspective the study feeds into current 
recommendations regarding the characteristics of audit committees.  Our findings highlight that 
financial expertise has a significant impact on audit fees and this is especially the case in relation to 
the levels of non-accounting expertise on audit committees.  Furthermore, we find that the impact 
of expertise differs between FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms with the representation of non-accounting 
expertise being especially important in the case of smaller listed firms.  We also find that greater 
audit committee experience does not impact audit fees, regardless of firm size.  The absence of a 
link between the holding of multiple audit committee positions and audit fees suggests that any 
additional expertise such positions bring may be cancelled out by the expected additional busyness 
of such audit committee members.   
In many ways our main finding that audit quality is influenced by the extent of non-
accounting rather than accounting expertise is counter-intuitive since much theory and policy 
suggests that more effective audit committees are likely to be associated with greater accounting 
expertise.  Specifically, current audit committee recommendations in the UK suggest a minimum 
level of financial expertise rather than the extent of such expertise while the Financial Reporting 
Council has deliberated whether that recommendation should be more focused  to ensure at least 
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one member with “accounting or auditing experience” (FRC, 2015) – equivalent to our accounting 
expertise category.  Our study provides some valuable insights on this.  In terms of overall financial 
expertise, on average, just over three quarters of audit committee members possess some financial 
expertise with 85 per cent of our sample of audit committees having at least one accounting expert, 
with accounting experts making up around one third of audit committee members.  This suggests 
that, in respect of FTSE350 firms at least, the vast majority of audit committee members possess 
some financial expertise while the vast majority of audit committees also have a minimum level of 
accounting expertise – all of which should be reassuring for regulators and may suggest that, in the 
case of larger firms, insisting on a minimum level of specific accounting expertise is unnecessary.  
Indeed, our findings clearly illustrate that audit committees are not lacking financial expertise but 
possess a healthy blend of both accounting and non-accounting expertise 
An important contribution of our study is the finding that the extent of non-accounting 
expertise exerts a positive impact on audit quality.  We find that, on average, non-accounting 
experts comprise just over 40 per cent of audit committee members in our sample, with this 
proportion around 50 per cent in the case of FTSE100 firms.  This is interesting as it emphasizes the 
level of representation of non-accounting expertise on UK audit committees.  Our findings point to 
the value of such non-accounting expertise in encouraging a more extensive (and more expensive) 
audit and in this way enhancing the value of the statutory audit.  By definition these audit 
committee members are expected to be less specialized and possess less technical accounting 
knowledge than their accounting colleagues so may be anxious to encourage more extensive 
auditing to compensate for their own relative lack of expertise.  This is similar to O’Sullivan (2000) 
who argued that, prior to Cadbury (1992) in the UK, higher levels of non-executive directors pursued 
additional auditing as a means of seeking to transfer their increasingly onerous monitoring 
responsibility to auditors.    This finding should reassure governance regulators since it clearly shows 
that non-accounting financial experts may be aware of potential technical accounting shortcomings 
in their expertise and compensate for this through the insistence on a more thorough audit.  In this 
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regard, our study suggests that both specialist and non-specialist financial experts may seek to 
enhance audit quality but in different ways.  Future research could usefully seek to interview audit 
committee members in order to get a clearer understanding of how members’ experience and 
expertise impact the degree of audit intensity they desire and in doing so, further improve our 
understanding of the findings reported here. 
The absence of any impact of financial expertise in the FTSE100 firms may be explained by 
such firms having particularly strong audit committee characteristics so there may be little scope for 
additional financial expertise to influence the intensity of the audit.  Non-FTSE100 firms, on the 
other hand, on average possess relatively weaker audit committee governance characteristics so 
may have more scope for financial expertise to influence audit quality.  In our sample, compared to 
FTSE100 firms, FTSE250 firms have lower levels of board independence and lower levels of 
compliance with best practice recommendations across all audit committee variables.  This is 
consistent with the arguments of Armstrong et al. (2010) who suggest that smaller firms may lack 
the levels of financial transparency exhibited by larger firms and audit committee expertise may be 
utilized to seek to compensate for this.  While our findings broadly support this, we go on to show 
that the non-accounting financial experts seek to achieve this via a more extensive audit.    This 
finding also reminds us of the need to appreciate that not all listed firms face the same governance 
challenges so researchers and policymakers need to be cautious in offering a “one size fits all” 
prescription and that firms should have the freedom to apply some degree of specificity in the 
governance arrangements they put in place.   
This study focuses on the largest UK listed firms which tend to be under greater external 
regulation and investor/public scrutiny.  An interesting extension of this work would be to look at 
the levels and impact of audit committee expertise both in non-FTSE350 firms as well as in other 
listed firms such as on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM).  Currently, fully-listed firms outside 
the FTSE350 are subject to a slightly diluted version of the UK Corporate Governance Code while 
firms on the AIM face no such requirements.  The audit committee choices such smaller firms make 
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and the audit quality impact of such choices has the potential to further improve our understanding 
of the value of financial expertise, especially in less regulated environments. 
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Notes  
                                                          
1  Zaman et al. (2011) examine a range of audit committee characteristics and audit fees but their definition 
of expertise is simply a binary variable indicating the presence of a financial expert (broadly defined) or not.  
Crucially, the Zaman et al. (2011) study covers a period largely prior to the adoption of the Combined Code 
(2003) which contained the initial UK recommendation relating to audit committee expertise.  Indeed, in 
footnote 10 of their paper, Zaman et al. (2011) mention that the absence of more varied definitions of 
expertise may be one limitation of their study.   
2  Prior to the publication of the revised UK Corporate Governance Code in 2016, the FRC consulted on 
whether the existing broader definition of financial expertise should be replaced with a narrower more 
accounting/auditing requirement.  However, in light of significant user feedback in support of the status quo 
they decided to retain the requirement of “recent and relevant financial experience” in the revised version of 
the code.  Please see:https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Audit-and-Assurance-Team/Feedback-
Statement-and-Impact-Assessment-Consulta.pdf for insights into this discussion. 
3  As discussed in section two, governance recommendations have focused specifically on four aspects of 
audit committees – size, independence, expertise and meeting frequency – and research studies tend to follow 
a similar approach typically investigating the impact of these characteristics in the context of the existing audit 
pricing model.   The following gives a sense of the main findings regarding the relationship between audit 
committee size, independence and meeting frequency on audit fees while expertise is addressed in more 
detail in subsequent paragraphs.  Abbott et al. (2003) find that more independent audit committees exert a 
positive impact on audit fees but that meeting frequency has no significance.  Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) 
find that larger audit committees are associated with higher audit fees.  Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) report that 
audit committee size and meeting frequency exert a positive impact on audit fees.  The findings of these 
studies appear to provide support for the notion that audit committees serve as a useful complement to the 
statutory audit in monitoring management.  Beyond the USA context, in an Australian study, Goodwin-Stewart 
and Kent (2006) find that meeting frequency has a positive impact on audit fees but that the degree of 
independence has no impact.  In the only previous UK study that has examined the impact of audit committee 
characteristics on audit fees, Zaman et al. (2011) find that audit committee size, independence and meeting 
frequency all have a positive and significant impact on audit fees.   
4  The current UK Corporate Governance Code (2016), or any of its predecessors, does not provide a precise 
definition of what it means by financial expertise.  As a result, for the purposes of this study, we followed the 
SEC’s definitions, which is also used by DeFond et al. (2005) and other USA-based studies whereby an 
accounting financial expert is defined as a person who has previously held or currently holds a job directly 
related to accounting and auditing expertise. These include CPAs, CFOs, CAOs, controllers, and auditors.  A 
non-accounting financial expert is defined as a person who has experience as an investment banker, financial 
analyst, or any other financial management role; or experience obtained from supervising the preparation of 
financial statements (e.g., chief executive officer or company president).  We follow this with appropriate 
modifications for the UK context in identifying financial expertise generally and distinguishing between 
accounting and non-accounting expertise. 
5  Since there is a vast literature on the determinants of audit pricing it follows that there are also a very 
large number of variables that could be included as control variables in this study.  However, we restrict our 
list to those commonly used variables that prior UK research has found to be statistically significant.  However, 
even then we have also utlilised more variables than presented here but restricted our final choice to those 
that showed some statistical significance.  However, all of our unreported regressions are available from the 
authors upon request.   
6  One of the anonymous reviewers suggested that including summary data on board size may help 
contextualise the audit committee data.  Boards in our sample comprise an average of 8.57 directors with a 
median of 8 directors.  The standard deviation is 2.36.  Board size ranges from a minimum of 4 directors to a 
maximum of 19.  
7  We are extremely grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this issue out and also for providing 
very helpful guidance as to how best to control for it. 
8  Following Petersen (2009) we cluster the standard errors on one dimension only (i.e. firms) since we have 
251 such clusters and do not cluster on years since we have only four years.  Petersen (2009) argues that with 
such a small number of years there is little advantage in also clustering on years but using dummy variables to 
control for the different years should produce similar results.  This is the approach we have taken.   
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9  We are extremely grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out and suggesting ways to 
overcome it. 
 
 
 
  
32 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abbott, L.J., Parker, S., Peters, G.F., Raghunandan, K. (2003). The association between audit committee 
characteristics and audit fees. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 22 (2), 17–32. 
 
Abbott, L.J., Parker, S., Peters, G.F., (2004). Audit committee characteristics and restatements. Auditing: 
A Journal of Practice and Theory, 23 (1), 69–87. 
 
Abdallah, W., Goergen, M., O’Sullivan, N. (2015). Endogeneity: How failure to correct for it can cause 
wrong inferences and some remedies. British Journal of Management, 26, 791-804. 
Agrawal, A., Chadha. S. (2005). Corporate governance and accounting scandals. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 48 (2), 371–406. 
Armstrong, C.S., Guay, W.R., Weber, J.P. (2010). The role of information and financial reporting in 
corporate governance and debt contracting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, pp. 179-234. 
Bedard, J., Chtourou, S.M., Courteau, L., (2004). The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, 
and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23 (2), 13–35. 
Bell, T.B., Doogar, R., Solomon, I. (2008). Audit labor usage and fees under business risk auditing. Journal 
of Accounting Research, 46, 729 – 760. 
 
Blue Ribbon Committee, (1999). Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. New York: New York Stock Exchange and 
National Association of Securities Dealers. 
 
Boo, E. F., Sharma, D. (2008). Effect of regulatory oversight on the association between internal 
governance characteristics and audit fees. Accounting and Finance, 48 (1), pp. 51–71. 
 
Brinn, T., Peel, M., Roberts, R. (1994). Audit fee determinants of independent and subsidiary unquoted 
companies in the UK: An exploratory study. British Accounting Review, 26 (2), 101-121. 
 
Bruynseels, L., Cardinaels, E. (2014). The audit committee: Management watchdog or personal friend of 
the CEO? The Accounting Review, 89 (1), 113-145. 
 
Cadbury Committee, (1992). Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. London: Gee. 
 
Cadbury Committee, (1995). The financial aspects of corporate governance – compliance with the code 
of best practice. London: Gee. 
 
Carcello, J.V., Hermanson, D.R., Neal, T.L., Riley Jnr. R.A. (2002). Board characteristics and audit fees. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 19 (3), 365-384. 
 
Carcello, J.V., Hollingsworth, C.W., Klein, A., Neal T.L. (2006). Audit committee financial expertise, 
competing governance mechanisms, and earnings management. Working paper, University of 
Tennessee. 
 
Chan, A.M.Y., Liu, G., Sun, J. (2013). Independent audit committee members’ board tenure and audit 
fees. Accounting and Finance, 53 (4), 1129 – 1147.  
 
Clatworthy, M., Peel, M. (2007). The effect of corporate status on external audit fees: Evidence from the 
UK. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 34, 169–201. 
 
 
33 
 
Cobbin, P.E. (2002). International dimensions of the audit fee determinants literature. International 
Journal of Auditing, 6 (1), 53-77. 
 
Cohen, J., Krishnamoorthy, G., Wright, A. (2004). The corporate governance mosaic and financial 
reporting quality. Journal of Accounting Literature, 23, 87–152. 
 
Cohen, J.R., Hoitash, U., Krishnamoorthy, G., Wright, A,M. (2014). The effect of audit committee industry 
expertise on monitoring the financial reporting process. The Accounting Review, 89 (1), 243–273 
 
Combined Code., (2003). The Combined Code on Corporate Governance. Financial Reporting Council, 
London. 
 
DeAngelo, L., 1981. Auditor independence, “low-balling” and disclosure regulation. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 3, 113–127. 
 
DeFond, M.L., Hann, R.N., Hu, X. (2005). Does the market value financial expertise on audit committees 
of boards of directors? Journal of Accounting Research, 43 (2), 153–193. 
 
Defond, M., Zhang, J (2014). A review of archival auditing research. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 58, 275 – 326. 
 
Dhaliwal, D., Naiker, V., Navissi, S. (2010). The association between accruals quality and the characteristics 
of accounting experts and mix of expertise on audit committees. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27, 
787–827. 
 
Financial Reporting Council (2015). Enhancing Confidence in Audit: Proposed Revisions to the Ethical 
Standard, Auditing Standards, UK Corporate Governance Code and Guidance on Audit Committees, 
Consultation, London. 
 
Francis, J.R. (2004). What do we know about audit quality? British Accounting Review, 36 (4), 345-368. 
 
Francis, J.R., 2011. A framework for understanding and researching audit quality. Auditing: A Journal of 
Practice & Theory, 30 (2), 125–152. 
 
Ghafran, C. M., O’Sullivan, N. (2013). The governance role of audit committees: Reviewing a decade of 
evidence. International Journal of Management Reviews, 15 (4), 381 – 407.  
 
Goodwin-Stewart, J., Kent, P. (2006). Relation between external audit fees, audit committee 
characteristics and internal audit. Accounting and Finance, 46 (3), 387–404. 
 
Hay, D. (2013). Further evidence from meta-analysis of audit fee research. International Journal of 
Auditing, 17 (2), 162 – 176. 
 
He, L., Yang, R. (2014). Does Industry Regulation Matter? New Evidence on Audit Committees and 
Earnings Management. Journal of Business Ethics, 123, 573 – 589. 
 
Higgs Report (2003), Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors 
(http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23012.pdf. Accessed 16 - 04 - 13). 
 
Hoitash, R., Hoitash, U. (2009). The role of audit committees in managing relationships with external 
auditors after SOX: Evidence from the USA. Managerial Auditing Journal, 24 (4), 368 – 397 
 
Kalbers, L. P., Fogarty, T. J. (1993). Audit committee effectiveness: An empirical investigation of the 
contribution of power. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 12 (1), 24–49. 
 
34 
 
Kezdi, G., (2004). Robust standard error estimation in fixed-effects panel models. Hungarian Statistical 
Review, 9, 95-116. 
 
Knechel, R.W., Niemi, L., Zerni, M., 2013. Empirical evidence on the implicit determinants of 
compensation in Big 4 audit partnerships. Journal of Accounting Research 51 (2), 349–387. 
 
Krishnan, G.V., Visvanathan, G., (2008). Does the SOX definition of an accounting expert matter? The 
association between audit committee directors’ accounting expertise and accounting conservatism. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 25, 827–857. 
 
Krishnan, G., Visvanathan, G. (2009). Do auditors price audit committee’s expertise? The case of 
accounting versus non-accounting financial experts. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 24 (1), 
115-144. 
 
Lee, Y.H., Mande, V. (2005), The relationship of audit committee characteristics with endogenously 
determined audit and non-audit fees. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 44 (3-4), 93-112. 
 
Lee, T., Stone, M. (1997). Economic Agency and Audit Committees: Responsibilities and Membership 
Composition. International Journal of Auditing, 1(2), 97 - 116. 
 
Levitt, A. (1998). ‘The numbers game’, remarks delivered at the NYU Center for Law and Business, New 
York, 28 September. 
 
Lo, A.W.Y., Wong, R.M.K., Firth, M., (2010). Can corporate governance deter management from 
manipulating earnings? evidence from related-party sales transactions in China. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 16, 225–235. 
 
Mitra, A., Hossain, M., Deis, D.R. (2007). The empirical relationship between ownership characteristics 
and audit fees. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 28 (3), 257-285. 
 
O’Sullivan, N. (2000). The impact of board Composition and ownership structure on audit quality: 
Evidence from large U.K. companies. British Accounting Review, 2000, 32 (4), 397-414. 
 
Petersen, M.A. (2009). Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches, 
Review of Financial Studies, 22 (1), 435-480. 
 
Rainsbury, E. A., Bradbury, M., Cahn, S. F. (2009). The impact of audit committee quality on financial 
reporting quality and audit fees. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, 5 (1), 20-33. 
 
Schmidt, J., and Wilkins, M. S. (2013). Bringing darkness to light: The influence of auditor quality and 
audit committee expertise on the timeliness of financial statement restatement disclosures. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice & Theory, 32 (1), 221–244. 
 
Seetharaman, A., Gul, F.A., Lynn, S.G. (2002). Litigation risk and audit fees: Evidence from UK firms cross-
listed on US markets. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33, 91–115. 
 
Simunic, D., Stein, M. (1987). Product differentiation in auditing: Auditor choice in the market for 
unseasoned new issues. Canadian Certified General’s Office. 
 
Smith Committee, (2003). Audit Committee Combined Code Guidance. Financial Reporting 
Council. London. 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. (2002). 107th Congress of the United States of America. Washington DC. 
 
35 
 
Tanyi, P.N. and Smith, D.B.  (2015). Busyness, expertise and financial reporting quality of audit 
committee chairs and financial experts. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 34, 59-89. 
 
Turley, S., Zaman, M. (2007). Audit committee effectiveness: Informal processes and behavioural effects. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 20, 765–88. 
 
UK Corporate Governance Code (2010-2016), Financial Reporting Council. London. 
US Senate (2002). Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Report 107-
205, 107th Congress, June 26 2002.  Available at: http://www.Senate.gov 
Vafeas, N., (2005). Audit committees, boards, and the quality of reported earnings. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 22 (4), 1093–1122. 
Vafeas, N., Waegelein, J. (2007). The association between audit committees, compensation incentives 
and corporate audit fees. The Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 28 (3), 241-255.  
 
Whisenant, S., Sankaraguruswamy, S., Raghunandan, K., (2003). Evidence on the joint determination of 
audit and non-audit fees. Journal of Accounting Research, 41 (4), 721 - 744. 
 
Winship, C., Morgan, S.L. (1999). The estimation of causal effects from observational data. Annual 
Review of Sociology. 25, 659-706. 
 
Zaman, M., Hudaib, M., Haniffa, R (2011). Corporate governance quality, audit fees and non-audit 
services fees. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 38 (1-2), 165-197.  
 
 
36 
 
 
 
 
Table 1a: Sample selection process 
 
Description 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
FTSE350  350 350 350 350 1400 
Financial and regulated firms  70 70 70 70 280 
FTSE350 dropout firms 15 15 15 15 60 
Missing Audit Committee and Datastream data 19 17 16 17 69 
Final sample  246 248 249 248 991 
 
 
 
Table 1b:  Industrial breakdown of sample firms 
Industry classification of sample firms N  Percentage 
Consumer Goods 218 22.00 
General Industrials  296 29.87 
Mineral Extraction 79 7.97 
Services  342 34.51 
Utilities 56 5.65 
Total  991 100.00 
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Table 2: Variable Definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Label Definitions 
Log Audit Fee Log of the audit fee 
AC % Financial Expertise Percentage of audit committee members who are financial experts  
AC % Accounting Expertise Percentage of audit committee members who are accounting experts 
AC % Non-Accounting 
Expertise Percentage of audit committee members who are non-accounting experts 
AC Average Other AC seats Average additional audit committee seats held in other listed firms by audit committee members 
AC Size Dummy 
 
Dummy variable (=1 if there are 3 or more members on the audit committee; 
=0 otherwise) 
AC Size Number of audit committee members 
AC Independence Dummy 
 
Dummy variable (=1 if all members of audit committee are independent non-
executive directors; =0 otherwise) 
AC % Independence 
 
Percentage of audit committee members who are independent non-executive 
directors 
AC Meetings Dummy 
 
Dummy variable (=1 if the number of audit committee meetings held during 
the year are 3 or greater; =0 otherwise) 
AC Meetings Number of audit committee meetings held during the year 
% Independent Directors Percentage of board represented by independent non-executive directors 
London Dummy variable (=1 if audit undertaken by a London-based auditor; =0 otherwise) 
Log Non Audit Log of the total non-audit fees paid to auditor  
Log Total Assets Log of total assets 
% Stock Percentage of total assets represented by inventories  
% Debtors Percentage of total assets represented by receivables  
ROA Return on assets  
Log Subs Log of the total number of subsidiaries  
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 Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Audit Fee (£000s) 1,681.00 606.00 3,179.00 34.00 26,000.00 
Log Audit Fee 5.85 5.78 0.55 4.53 7.42 
AC % Financial Expertise 78.39 75.00 23.89 0.00 100.00 
AC % Accounting Expertise 34.85 33.33 21.91 0.00 100.00 
AC % Non-Accounting Expertise 43.54 40.00 25.64 0.00 100.00 
AC Average Other AC seats 0.35 0.25 0.01 0.00 2.00 
AC Size Dummy 0.91 1.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 
AC Size 3.40 3.00 0.86 2.00 8.00 
AC Independence Dummy 0.87 1.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 
AC % Independence 95.29 100.00 12.79 0.00 100.00 
AC Meetings Dummy 0.94 1.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 
AC Meetings 3.90 4.00 1.23 1.00 12.00 
% Independent Directors 48.23 50.00 11.21 10.53 85.71 
London 0.61 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Log Non Audit 5.39 5.60 1.31 0.00 7.38 
Log Total Assets 9.04 8.96 0.66 7.52 11.19 
% Stock 11.31 6.92 15.78 0.00 96.42 
% Debtors 16.05 13.78 12.56 0.00 67.09 
ROA 9.06 7.55 10.79 -83.57 118.56 
Log Subs 1.22 1.26 0.39 0.00 2.23 
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Table 4 – Correlation Matrix (correlations that are statistically significant at 1% level of significance are shown in bold) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Log Audit Fee 1                   
2 AC % Financial Expertise .150 1                  
3 AC % Accounting Expertise -.094 .347 1                 
4 % Non-Accounting Expertise .215 .618 -.523 1                
5 AC Average Other AC Seats -.026 .147 .239 -.067 1               
6 AC Size Dummy .202 .048 -.179 .193 -.013 1              
7 AC Size .420 .008 -.231 .201 -.089 .522 1             
8 AC Independence Dummy .234 .015 -.041 .048 .072 -.053 .007 1            
9 AC % Independence .228 -.008 -.037 .024 .083 -.016 .025 .937 1           
10 AC Meetings Dummy .187 .041 .005 .033 .098 .142 .114 .113 .119 1          
11 AC Meetings .358 .088 -.006 .085 .025 .160 .215 .089 .111 .405 1         
12 % Independent Directors .471 .066 -.076 .123 -.025 .278 .388 .380 .415 .110 .279 1        
13 London .379 .056 -.028 .075 .030 .097 .198 .067 .048 .114 .208 .305 1       
14 Log Non Audit .494 .124 -.005 .117 .030 .103 .239 .110 .104 .041 .139 .196 .130 1      
15 Log Total Assets .765 .083 -.109 .167 -.037 .234 .445 .251 .249 .182 .312 .452 .278 .403 1     
16 % Stock -.165 -.042 .041 -.073 .061 -.018 -.008 .017 .028 .017 -.083 -.012 -.077 -.049 -.051 1    
17 % Debtors .005 -.010 .014 -.021 .003 -.028 -.065 -.027 -.020 -.041 -.028 -.155 -.101 .025 -.286 -.062 1   
18 ROA -.081 .016 -.011 .024 -.104 -.014 -.016 .012 .024 -.046 -.044 -.024 -.022 -.046 -.215 -.096 .159 1  
19 Log Subs .498 .065 -.041 .093 -.008 .081 .195 .087 .074 .073 .173 .114 .147 .209 .295 -.165 .137 -.058 1 
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Table 5:  OLS regressions examining the impact of audit committee financial expertise on Audit Fees.  
Results reported are robust standard errors clustered at firm level (n=251 firm clusters).  
(***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively). 
 
Variables 
Regressions 1a and 1b Regressions 2a and 2b Regressions 3a and 3b Regressions 4a and 4b 
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
AC % Financial 
Expertise 
(.0012) 
2.14** 
(.0011) 
2.27**       
AC % Accounting 
Expertise  
 
 
(-.0002) 
-0.30 
(-.0001) 
-0.08     
AC % Non-Accounting 
Expertise  
 
   
(.0012) 
2.58*** 
(.0010) 
2.23**   
AC Average Other AC 
Seats  
 
     
(-.0283) 
-0.90 
(-.0251) 
-0.78 
AC Size Dummy  (-.0726) -1.98**  
(-.0741) 
-1.93*  
(-.0884) 
-2.35**  
(-.0722) 
-1.92*  
AC Independence 
Dummy  
(-.0488) 
-1.43  
(-.0505) 
-1.47  
(-.0517) 
-1.48  
(-.0469) 
-1.36  
AC Meetings Dummy  (.1045) 2.77***  
(.1080) 
2.74***  
(.1089) 
2.77***  
(.1110) 
2.78***  
AC Size  (.0050) 0.29  
(.0023) 
0.13  
(-.0015) 
-0.09  
(.0016) 
0.09 
AC % Independence  (-.0009) -0.95  
(-.0010) 
-1.09  
(-.0010) 
-1.02  
(-.0009) 
-0.99 
AC Meetings  (.0282) 2.27**  
(.0295) 
2.34**  
(.0291) 
2.33**  
(.0298) 
2.38** 
% Independent 
Directors 
(.0065) 
4.71*** 
(.0054) 
3.90*** 
(.0066) 
4.70*** 
(.0056) 
3.95*** 
(.0065) 
4.72*** 
(.0055) 
3.95*** 
(.0065) 
4.67*** 
(.0055) 
3.93*** 
London (.1453) 4.84*** 
(.1437) 
4.83*** 
(.1467) 
4.88*** 
(.1448) 
4.87*** 
(.1453) 
4.81*** 
(.1442) 
4.82*** 
(.1478) 
4.91*** 
(.1460) 
4.89*** 
Log Non Audit Fee (.0633) 4.28*** 
(.0627) 
4.42*** 
(.0657) 
4.47*** 
(.0649) 
4.63*** 
(.0644) 
4.35*** 
(.0640) 
4.52*** 
(.0661) 
4.46*** 
(.0654) 
4.62*** 
Log total Assets (.5228) 17.73*** 
(.5100) 
16.63*** 
(.5227) 
17.44*** 
(.5115) 
16.48*** 
(.5139) 
17.51*** 
(.5088) 
16.46*** 
(.5218) 
17.24*** 
(.5107) 
16.32*** 
% Stock (-.0022) -2.51** 
(-.0022) 
-2.56** 
(-.0022) 
-2.47** 
(-.0022) 
-2.52** 
(-.0021) 
-2.35** 
(-.0022) 
-2.41** 
(-.0022) 
-2.42** 
(-.0022) 
-2.46** 
% Debtors (.0069) 5.13*** 
(.0067) 
4.74*** 
(.0068) 
4.92*** 
(.0066) 
4.58*** 
(.0068) 
4.96*** 
(.0066) 
4.58*** 
(.0068) 
4.91*** 
(.0066) 
4.56*** 
ROA (.0024) 2.24** 
(.0023) 
2.22** 
(.0025) 
2.28** 
(.0024) 
2.31** 
(.0024) 
2.22** 
(.0023) 
2.23** 
(.0024) 
2.17** 
(.0024) 
2.20** 
Log Subsidiaries (.2595) 6.06*** 
(.2544) 
5.99*** 
(.2616) 
6.11*** 
(.2564) 
6.05*** 
(.2590) 
6.04*** 
(.2551) 
6.00*** 
(.2606) 
6.10*** 
(.2556) 
6.04*** 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Constant (-.1521) -0.65 
(-.0218) 
-0.09 
(-.0698) 
-0.29 
(.0501) 
0.21 
(-.0713) 
-0.31 
(.0450) 
0.22 
(-.0636) 
-0.27 
(.0590) 
0.25 
F Test 86.62*** 83.00*** 86.18*** 83.90*** 87.62*** 84.84*** 87.20*** 85.07*** 
(Adjusted) R2 0.7881 0.7888 0.7856 0.7865 0.7884 0.7886 0.7860 0.7869 
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Table 6:  Mean and median comparisons of FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms1  
(***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 
Variables FTSE100 
(n=352) 
FTSE250 
(n=639) 
FTSE100 
(n=352) 
FTSE250 
(n=639) 
 Mean Mean Median Median 
AC % Financial Expertise 81.11* 78.36 80.00 75.00 
AC % Accounting Expertise 30.50 37.61*** 33.33 33.33*** 
AC % Non-Accounting Expertise 50.61*** 40.75 50.00*** 33.33 
AC Average Other AC seats 0.30 0.38*** 0.25 0.33* 
AC Size Dummy 0.97*** 0.87 1.00*** 1.00 
AC Size 3.80*** 3.19 4.00*** 3.00 
AC Independence Dummy 0.94*** 0.80 1.00*** 1.00 
AC Independence  98.30*** 93.09 100.00*** 100.00 
AC Meetings Dummy 0.99*** 0.92 1.00*** 1.00 
AC Meetings  4.29*** 3.69 4.00*** 3.00 
% Independent Directors 53.87*** 45.14 54.55*** 44.44 
London 0.76*** 0.53 1.00*** 1.00 
Log Non Audit 6.01*** 5.05 6.11*** 5.30 
Log Total Assets 9.64*** 8.70 9.54*** 8.67 
% Stock 7.19 13.57*** 6.08 8.03*** 
% Debtors 13.90 17.24*** 12.31 15.02*** 
ROA 9.06 9.05 7.98 7.31 
Log Subs 1.38*** 1.13 1.41*** 1.18 
 
1Comparisons are undertaken using the parametric t-test (means) and the non-parametric Wilcoxon test (medians). 
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Table 7:  OLS regressions examining the impact of audit committee financial expertise on audit fees for 
FTSE100 and FTSE250 firms. Results reported are robust standard errors clustered at firm level. 
(***, **, * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 
Variables 
Regressions 1a and 1b 
FTSE100        FTSE250 
Regressions 2a and 2b 
FTSE100          FTSE250 
Regressions 3a and 3b 
FTSE100       FTSE250 
Regressions 4a and 4b 
FTSE100       FTSE250 
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
Coefficient  
T Value  
AC % Expertise (-.0003) -0.26 
(.0015) 
2.99***       
AC % Accounting 
Expertise  
 
 
(-.0013) 
-0.92 
(.0006) 
0.99     
AC % Non-Accounting 
Expertise  
 
   
(.0007) 
0.80 
(.0010) 
2.09**   
AC Average Other AC 
Seats  
 
     
(.0141) 
0.24 
(-.0058) 
-0.18 
AC Size (.0098) 0.36 
(.0014) 
0.07 
(.0051) 
0.19 
(.0025) 
0.12 
(.0093) 
0.35 
(-.0075) 
-0.36 
(.0111) 
0.41 
(-.0025) 
-0.12 
AC % Independence (-.0027) -1.17 
(.0002) 
0.29 
(-.0030) 
-1.30 
(.0001) 
0.21 
(-.0026) 
-1.16 
(.0002) 
0.21 
(-.0026) 
-1.13 
(.0001) 
0.13 
AC Meetings (.0264) 1.28 
(.0253) 
1.17* 
(.0256) 
1.25 
(.0277) 
1.87* 
(.0267) 
1.28 
(.0277) 
1.88* 
(.0266) 
1.28 
(.0286) 
1.92* 
% Independent 
Directors 
(.0090) 
3.19*** 
(.0024) 
2.04** 
(.0093) 
3.25*** 
(.0025) 
2.02** 
(.0090) 
3.14*** 
(.0025) 
2.08** 
(.0090) 
3.21*** 
(.0025) 
2.07** 
London (.1411) 2.26** 
(.1319) 
4.20*** 
(.1414) 
2.34** 
(.1286) 
4.02*** 
(.1343) 
2.19** 
(.1297) 
4.09*** 
(.1370) 
2.22** 
(.1282) 
3.99*** 
Log Non Audit Fee (.1051) 1.82* 
(.0447) 
4.58*** 
(.1041) 
1.81* 
(.0467) 
4.53*** 
(.1022) 
1.72* 
(.0469) 
4.51*** 
(.1041) 
1.76* 
(.0476) 
4.54*** 
Log total Assets (.3989) 6.26*** 
(.4249) 
9.83*** 
(.3996) 
6.23*** 
(.4313) 
9.97*** 
(.3971) 
6.23*** 
(.4261) 
9.75*** 
(.3982) 
6.27*** 
(.4307) 
9.93*** 
% Stock (.0020) 0.41 
(-.0016) 
-1.99** 
(.0013) 
0.28 
(-.0017) 
-2.20** 
(.0012) 
0.24 
(-.0014) 
-1.81* 
(.0019) 
0.37 
(-.0016) 
-2.01** 
% Debtors (.0051) 1.78* 
(.0066) 
4.78*** 
(.0049) 
1.70* 
(.0064) 
4.58*** 
(.0050) 
1.76* 
(.0065) 
4.51*** 
(.0051) 
1.79* 
(.0064) 
4.50*** 
ROA (.0008) 0.38 
(.0008) 
0.61 
(.0011) 
0.51 
(.0011) 
0.91 
(.0011) 
0.51 
(.0008) 
0.64 
(.0009) 
0.41 
(.0011) 
0.84 
Log Subsidiaries (.1704) 2.45** 
(.2953) 
6.71*** 
(.1675) 
2.43** 
(.2983) 
6.85*** 
(.1673) 
2.43** 
(.3011) 
6.90*** 
(.1707) 
2.47** 
(.3005) 
6.90*** 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included 
Constant (1.106) 1.69* 
(.7535) 
2.07** 
(1.1583) 
1.78* 
(.7769) 
2.12** 
(1.088) 
1.68* 
(.8311) 
2.24** 
(1.079) 
1.65 
(.8123) 
2.19** 
F Test 12.86*** 31.38*** 12.78*** 31.29*** 12.45*** 31.19*** 12.64*** 31.52*** 
(Adjusted) R2 0.6325 0.6554 0.6354 0.6464 0.6336 0.6498 0.6324 0.6453 
 
 
